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We analyze a dynamic game between a buyer and a seller of an ex-
haustible resource. The seller chooses resource supply; the buyer can
pay a fixed cost to invent a perfect substitute for the resource at any
time. In closed-loop equilibrium, the buyer adopts the substitute when
the resource is exhausted. Investing makes the buyer worse off because
it decreases resource supply, destroys his ability to derive surplus from
the resource through delaying the investment cost incurrence, and causes
a larger share of the resource stock to be sold at his reservation price.
From the seller’s perspective, the buyer’s ability to develop a substitute is
equivalent to an already available substitute with a higher marginal cost.
JEL-Classification: O30, Q30
Keywords: exhaustible resource, substitute, innovation, closed-loop equilibrium
1 Introduction
The oil market has flavours of a bilateral monopoly. The largest exporters have
united themselves in OPEC, a cartel that controls more than 75% of proven
reserves and actively manages supply. Importing countries coordinate on energy
policy and energy security issues through various international organizations
such as the IEA, OECD and EU, and cooperate in the development of renewable
alternatives. Consuming countries are vulnerable to monopoly power because of
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their heavy dependency on oil, but also have the means to end this dependency
through developing a backstop: a substitute that can replace oil as the dominant
energy source.
To prolong consumers’ dependence on their resource, oil exporters have an
incentive to prevent prices from becoming too high. Indeed, one of OPEC’s
aims is to ’secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to con-
sumers’. Conversely, importing countries realize that investment in renewables
is not only a remedy to the physical scarcity of oil, but also affects exporters’
supply decisions. The resulting strategic interaction is the subject of this pa-
per: we ask how an exhaustible resource seller can adjust the supply path to
preserve its monopoly, and how a buyer can optimally use the ability to develop
a substitute.
A key feature of exhaustible resource markets is that expectations about
future demand affect current supply. A binding promise by the buyer in the
initial period about the arrival time of the substitute [Dasgupta et al., 1983,
Gallini et al., 1983] will therefore not only change market conditions when the
substitute comes on line, but also affect the supply path in all preceding peri-
ods [Karp and Newberry, 1993]. As time passes, the effect on supply in early
periods becomes sunk, so the buyer faces a different trade-off than in the ini-
tial period. As a result, the buyer’s optimal open-loop strategy is not time-
consistent [Olsen, 1986, 1993]: the buyer has an incentive to commit to late
development in order to depress current prices, but would like to renege on his
promise when the resource becomes scarce (see section 3). It is unnatural to
suppose that the seller is sufficiently rational to calculate dynamic equilibria,
but naive enough to believe announcements that are not credible. The contri-
bution of this paper is to derive the closed-loop solution to the investment and
supply game.
We use a simple model and a highly stylized representation of the innovation
process. In each period, a monopolistic seller makes a supply offer to a buyer.
After observing the seller’s offer, the buyer decides whether to pay a fixed in-
vestment cost and develop a perfect substitute. Upon investment, the substitute
can immediately be produced at constant marginal cost and competes with the
resource. We abstract from uncertainty, capacity constraints, R&D externali-
ties and imperfect cartelization in order to focus on the strategic aspects of the
resource supply and innovation decisions.
In equilibrium, the seller induces the buyer to delay the adoption of the sub-
stitute until the resource is exhausted. When the buyer cannot commit to future
actions, his only means to influence current supply is to invest immediately. Do-
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ing so adversely affects the buyer in three ways. Firstly, the seller immediately
reduces supply following investment. Secondly, the buyer loses the ability to
derive surplus from the resource through saving the interest on the investment
cost. Thirdly, a larger share of the remaining resource stock is sold at the buyer’s
reservation price. From the seller’s perspective, the buyer’s ability to develop a
substitute is equivalent to an already available substitute with a higher marginal
cost. Like in Hoel [1978], the seller limit-prices at the buyer’s reservation price,
which is higher than the marginal cost of the substitute because of the fixed in-
vestment cost. The buyer’s indifference condition for investment only becomes
binding when the remaining resource stock is sufficiently small.
Our model offers an explanation for the slow progress in renewable energy.
Developing a substitute does not help industrialized countries to capture a larger
share of the oil rent. So as long as oil prices do not become prohibitively high,
there is little economic rationale for substantive efforts.
Four recent papers consider similar questions. Liski and Montero [2011]
study the optimal demand schedule of an exhaustible resource monopsonist
that has access to a substitute. Their results are similar to ours to the extent
that the buyer would like to commit to postpone the switch to the substitute to
depress current prices, and the buyer’s share of the resource surplus increases
in the cost of the substitute when the buyer cannot commit. An important
difference is that the perfectly competitive sellers in Liski and Montero [2011]
only compete with the substitute for an infinitesimally short period. Because
the exhaustion of the resource always coincides with the switch to the sub-
stitute, postponing the switch decreases current resource supply. The buyer
obtains lower prices because committing to late invention increases his monop-
sony power. In our framework, the monopolistic seller may compete with the
substitute for a nondegenerate period when the buyer can commit the invention
time [Olsen, 1993]. Postponing the arrival of the substitute increases cumula-
tive resource supply before invention. Current prices go down because current
supply goes up, rather than because of an increase in monopsony power as in
Liski and Montero [2011]. As a result, initial resource use is higher under com-
mitment than under discretion in our paper, but lower in Liski and Montero
[2011].1
In Harris and Vickers [1995], the arrival of the substitute is a stochastic event
and depends on the buyer’s R&D effort. As the buyer’s effort increases when the
stock dwindles, the seller has an incentive to slow down depletion in closed-loop
1A formal proof for the general case is beyond the scope of this paper. We provide an
example with iso-elastic demand in Appendix D.
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equilibrium. Jaakkola [2012] looks at a game with gradual substitute develop-
ment and convex per-period investment costs. This generalization prohibits an
analytical characterization of the closed-loop equilibrium. In Gerlagh and Liski
[2011], the substitute is not available immediately following investment, but af-
ter an exogenous transition period. By investing, the buyer can force the seller
to sell the remaining stock during the transition period. The value of this in-
vestment option decreases as the resource is depleted. To compensate the buyer
for this decrease, supply is increasing over time during an interval before invest-
ment. Although Gerlagh and Liski look for a Markov-perfect equilibrium, the
time-to-build delay acts as a commitment device.
2 Model
Consider a model with a buyer and a seller of an exhaustible resource. We adopt
the notation of Gerlagh and Liski [2011]. The buyer derives flow surplus u(qt)
from consuming qt units of the resource. Let u(.) be increasing and continu-
ously differentiable. The surplus function is associated with a consumer utility
function ũ (.) satisfying u (qt) = ũ (qt) − ũ′ (qt) qt and inverse demand function
ψ(qt) = ũ
′ (qt). A monopolistic seller is endowed with a finite stock s0 that is
costless to extract. The seller aims to maximize the discounted stream of in-
stantaneous profits π (qt) = ũ
′ (qt) qt. Utility and profits are discounted at rate
r.
The buyer can instantaneously develop a perfect substitute for the resource.
By paying an upfront investment cost I, he gains the ability to produce the






There are i = 1, .., N periods of time of length ε. Time is continuous but
agents only act at the beginning of each period, i.e. at time points ti = ε(i−1).
They commit their actions for the entire period. We distinguish between a pre-
investment phase A and a post-investment phase B. In phase A, the buyer has
a binary decision variable kti ∈ {0, 1}, where kti = 1 indicates that the buyer
develops the substitute. In phase A, each period has three stages:
(1) the seller offers to supply a quantity qti
(2) the buyer chooses kti ∈ {0, 1}
(3) when kti = 0, the market clears at price pti = ψ(qti), or when kti = 1, the
seller’s offer is rejected and the economy moves to regime B
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In phase B, the seller is the only mover and chooses quantity qti . The mar-
ket clears at price pti = min (ψ(qti), c), because the buyer cannot prevent the
seller from competing with the substitute.
Our timing reflects the mutual dependence of buyers and sellers in natural
resource markets, and oil exporters’ concerns about security of supply: if the
supply offer is sufficiently generous, the buyer will refrain from investing. Olsen
[1993] uses the same setup as our paper, but the buyer moves before the seller
in each period. This timing forces the buyer to invest very early, as he cannot
credibly punish the seller for setting a high price.2
3 The time-consistency problem
Olsen [1993] sketches why equilibria in which the buyer can commit the invest-
ment time are not consistent. According to the Hotelling rule, a monopolistic
seller equates discounted marginal revenue in all periods. When the arrival time
of the substitute T ′ is fixed, additional supply in any period after T ′ does not
cause inframarginal losses because the resource is sold at the substitute price.
As marginal revenue is relatively high after the arrival of the substitute, the
seller would like to sell part of his stock in the post-investment phase. This is
socially inefficient and reduces the buyer’s welfare, because the seller directly
displaces substitute supply using scarce resource units. When the buyer com-
mits to a late T ′, the seller’s post-investment revenues are discounted at a higher
rate. This makes it less attractive for the seller to compete with the substitute,
thereby reducing cumulative post-investment supply.
A late T ′ results in higher cumulative extraction in the pre-investment phase
and increased supply in early periods, but is costly for the buyer in later pe-
riods: when the resource becomes scarce, the buyer cannot dispose over the
substitute as early as he would like. After having enjoyed the benefits of high
supplies and low prices early on, the buyer has an incentive to avoid the costs
of resource scarcity in subsequent periods by developing the substitute earlier
than announced. We illustrate this incentive in Figure 1. After T̂ , supply drops
below the buyer’s reservation quantity q̆, which is defined such that u (q̆) equals
2Olsen does not analyze large initial stocks and restricts himself to the limit-pricing phase.
For large stocks, the buyer cannot credibly prevent the seller from treating his problem as a
free-terminal-time problem with a scrap value, the scrap value being the discounted profits
from the limit-pricing phase. The buyer thus invests before the remaining stock reaches the


































Figure 1: The buyer’s time-consistency problem
the utility u (q∗) of consuming the long-run substitute supply q∗ minus the inter-
est on the investment cost rI. After T̂ , the buyer prefers to invest immediately
instead of at the announced time T ′.
4 Post-investment phase
When making decisions during phase A, agents take into account their payoffs
in phase B. We therefore first turn to phase B. When the period length ε is







min (ψ (qt) , c) qte
−rtdt
s.t. ṡ = −qt, qt ≥ 0, st ≥ 0, s0 given (1)
The Hamiltonian for this problem and the necessary optimality conditions are
H (q, s, λ) = min (ψ (qt) , c) qt − λq
π′ (qt)− λt ≤ 0, q ≥ ψ−1 (c) c.s.
λ̇t = rλt, lim
t→∞
λtst = 0 (2)





ψ (qt)− qtψ′ (qt) for qt ≥ D (c)
c for qt < D (c)
Because a perfect substitute is available at cost c, marginal revenue π′ (qt) is
equal to c for the first q∗ ≡ ψ−1 (c) units and discontinuous at q∗, as the
seller starts incurring losses on inframarginal units. If the seller practices a
limit-pricing strategy, supplying q∗ in each period until exhaustion, the stock is
exhausted at time s/q∗. For small values of the remaining stock, the marginal
revenue π′ (qt) |qt≥q∗ of supplying a unit in excess of q∗ is always lower than
the present value of c at time s/q∗. The seller then supplies q∗ in each period
until exhaustion time T . When the remaining stock is large, limit pricing takes
so long to exhaust the stock that π′ (q∗) is higher than ce−rst/q
∗
. It is then
worthwhile to supply qt > q
∗ in early periods.












When the remaining stock s < s∗
qt = q
∗ ∀ t ∈ (0, T ) , T = s
q∗






∀ t ∈ [0, T −∆)
qt = q








dt+∆q∗ = s (4)
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The above system defines the seller’s optimal post-investment strategy φI (s; c).
Figure 2 illustrates the seller’s supply path during the post-investment phase.
In equilibrium, the seller is indifferent between supplying an extra unit in any
period before T − ∆ and marginally extending the limit-pricing period. The
present value of marginal revenue π′ (qt) e
−rt equals ce−rT between [0, T −∆]
and at T .





























Figure 2: The seller’s optimal supply (left) and the present value of marginal
revenue (right) during the post-investment phase
5 Closed-loop equilibrium
It will be useful to define the value function for the seller V (s) and buyer U(s)
as a function of the remaining stock during phase A. Denote the buyer’s and
seller’s value at the time of investment by U I (s) and V I (s), respectively. Let
κ (s, q) be the buyer’s investment strategy and φ(s) the seller’s supply strategy.
The value for the seller is the payoff from choosing the optimal q for an interval
of length ε, given the strategic response of the buyer
V (s) = max
{q}
{[επ(q) + e−εrV (s− εq)](1− κ(s, q)) + V I(s)κ(s, q)}. (5)
We define the value for the buyer analogously
U(s) = max
k∈{0,1}
{[εu(φ(s)) + e−εrU(s− εφ(s))](1− k) + U I(s)k}. (6)
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The value of the resource to the buyer W (s) is the utility it provides on top of
the long-run level





The post-investment values U I (s) and V I (s) are determined by the dynamics




[u (qt)− ū] e−rtdt (7)
We look for a pair of equilibrium strategies such that φ (s) = argmax{q} V (s)
and κ (s, φ (s)) = argmaxk U (s) for all s. Because the buyer can guarantee
himself the long-run surplus ū−rI by investing, the buyer’s strategy maximizes
his value of the resource W (s). Proposition 2 states the main result.
Proposition 2. There exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
The buyer’s equilibrium strategy is
κ (s, q) = 1 ∀ q : u(q) < ū− rI (8a)
κ (s, q) = 0 o.w. (8b)






, with φI (s; c)
as defined in Proposition 1.
The buyer’s reservation utility in the post-investment phase is u(q∗) = ū,
the utility he attains by consuming the substitute. The seller always supplies
q ≥ q∗, because there is no loss on inframarginal units for smaller q. The buyer’s
reservation utility before investment is u(q̆) = ū − rI, reflecting that resource
consumption allows him to delay investment. The seller’s best response to the
buyer’s equilibrium strategy is to supply at least q ≥ q̆, because he would trigger
investment for smaller q.
Although the motivation differs in the pre- and post-investment phase, the
seller always supplies at least the buyer’s reservation quantity. From the seller’s
perspective, the threat of the substitute is equivalent to an already available
substitute with a higher marginal cost. Adopting the substitute does not change
the equilibrium dynamics except for raising the buyer’s reservation utility from
ū − rI to ū. This is not accompanied by an increase in actual utility, as the
buyer pays interest rI on the sunk investment cost. The increase in the buyer’s
reservation utility has three effects, as we show in Figure 3. Firstly, the buyer’s
surplus from the resource (u(q) minus the reservation utility) is lower for any
given supply path: u (q) − u (q̆) > u (q) − u (q∗). Secondly, the seller decreases
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supply in early periods when the buyer invests: φ (s) > φI (s) when s > s∗ [Hoel,
1978, 1983]. The maximum price for the resource decreases after investment; to
compensate for this, the seller increases the price in early periods. Thirdly, a





< q∗ (T −∆). Combining these effects, the buyer’s surplus from
the resource decreases after investment.
Figure 3: Resource supply before and after investment as a function of time
(left) and the remaining stock (right)
Corollary 1. W (s) ↓ 0 when r ↓ 0
The buyer receives a positive surplus from the resource when the seller is
too impatient to sell the entire stock at the buyer’s reservation price. As r
approaches zero, this consideration vanishes and so does W (s).
In the Appendix, we derive the same results when the buyer can invest a con-
tinuous amount in each period and the marginal cost of the substitute depends
on cumulative investment. The buyer invests the amount that maximizes con-
sumption utility minus the interest on the investment costs in one go when the




Strategic exhaustible resource buyers have an incentive to delay the adoption of
a substitute in order to depress current prices. When the buyer cannot commit
to the arrival time of the substitute, a monopolistic seller can induce the buyer
to delay adoption until exhaustion. In the absence of uncertainty or a fixed
time-to-build delay, the threat of a substitute has a similar effect as an already
available substitute in closed-loop equilibrium. The model is highly stylized -
for example, OPEC and industrialized economies both face substantial coordi-
nation and free-riding problems that impede their ability to act as a monopolist
or jointly develop a substitute. Nonetheless, the results accord with the slow
technological progress in renewable energy and oil exporters’ efforts to stabilize
prices.
A Proof of Proposition 1
The seller supplies q∗ at time t when the MR of supplying an additional unit is
lower than the discounted MR at the time of exhaustion, i.e.
π′ (q∗) ≤ λt = λT e−r(T−t) = ce−r(T−t)
Solving for T − t yields








The seller supplies q∗ in each period until exhaustion when this inequality holds




. We can calculate the threshold stock s∗ such that the seller
practices limit pricing until exhaustion for all s ≤ s∗ by substituting T = sq∗









When s > s∗, the seller extracts the last s∗ units in a period of length ∆ =
s∗
q∗ . While extracting the first s − s∗ units, marginal revenue rises at the rate
of interest and is equal the present value of marginal revenue at the time of
exhaustion
π′ (qt) = ce
−r(T−t)





Let η(.) = (π′)
−1
be the seller’s supply as a function of marginal revenue. The







dt+∆q∗ = s (10)
B Proof of Proposition 2
We make use of a special case of Proposition 3 in Hoel [1983].
Lemma 1 (post-investment phase, Hoel [1983]). When s > s∗, φI (s; c) is
increasing in c.
Because of the buyer’s investment option, the resource is exhausted in finite
time. This means there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
We assume that the number of periods N is sufficiently large, such that the
optimal strategies are not affected by the length of the game. The buyer’s
strategy maximizes U(s) with respect to k. His value from investing is


















(ū− rI) e−rtdt+W I (s; c)
Let Ŭ (s) denote the payoff when the buyer adopts the equilibrium strategy, and































(ū− rI) e−rtdt+W I (s; c̆)
In order to prove that Ŭ (s) ≥ U I (s), it is sufficient to show that W I (s; c)
is weakly increasing in c. By Lemma 1, φI (s; c) increases in c for s > s∗.
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Moreover, ū decreases in c. Then T −∆ increases in c. Therefore, W I (s; c) is
strictly increasing in c when s > s∗, that is, when the limit-pricing phase has
not yet started. When s ≤ s∗, observe that ∂q∗∂c < 0 and ∂∆∂c ≤ 0, so ∂s
∗
∂c ≤ 0.
When the seller is limit pricing, he will keep limit-pricing after a reduction in
c. Thus, ∂W
I(s;c)
∂c = 0 for s ≤ s∗.
The seller always supplies at least q̆ given that the buyer only invests when
q < q̆. When the seller chooses a qt < q̆, he triggers immediate investment
and is subject to the more stringent constraint qt ≥ q∗ for the remainder of the
game. Choosing qt < q̆ therefore cannot be optimal, provided the period length
ε is sufficiently small.
C Continuous Investment
In this section, we generalize the buyer’s problem: rather than making a discrete
investment decision, the buyer can invest a continuous amount in each period.
The marginal cost of the substitute is a decreasing function of cumulative in-
vestment








. The timing in each stage is
(1) the seller supplies a quantity qti
(2) the buyer chooses i
(3) the market clears at price pti = min (ψ(qti), c (I))
Profits and utility depend on the stance of technology I in addition to the sup-
ply q. Let φ (s, I) denote the seller’s supply strategy and ι (s, I, q) the buyer’s
investment strategy. The value functions are given by
V (s, I) =max
{q}
{
επ (I, q) + e−ǫrV (s− εq, I + ει (s, I, q))
}
(11)
U (s, I) =max
{i}
{
ε (u (I, φ (s, I))− i) + e−εrU (s− εφ (s, I) , I + εi)
}
(12)
Analogously to the main text, we can express the value of the resource to the
buyer as















The equilibrium is similar to the one in Proposition 2. The buyer selects the
cumulative investment level I∗ that yields the highest long-run utility ū − rI,
and invest this amount in one go when the resource is exhausted.
Proposition 3. Let I∗ be the solution to ∂ū∂I = r. There exists a subgame-perfect
equilibrium in pure strategies. The buyer’s equilibrium strategy is
ι (s, 0, q) = I∗ ∀q : u (q) < ū (c (I∗))− rI∗ (13a)
ι (s, I, q) = 0 o.w. (13b)
and the seller’s equilibrium strategy is




c (I) , u−1 (ū (c (I∗))− rI∗)
))
(14)
with φI (s; c) as defined in Proposition 1.
Proof. First, we show that given the seller’s strategy (14), the buyer’s strat-
egy must satisfy ~I ≡
∫∞
0
idt = I∗. Suppose that for a certain buyer’s strategy





> 0. Suppose that ~I > I∗. Then the buyer must either
invest a positive amount when cumulative investment already exceeds I∗, or
invest a large amount when I < I∗ such that cumulative investment overshoots
I∗. We discuss both cases in turn. Firstly, suppose there exists an I such that
I∗ ≤ I and ι (s, I, φ (s, I)) > 0 for some s. Let I ′ denote the largest such I. Then
the buyer can marginally improve his welfare by choosing ι (s, I ′, φ (s, I ′)) = 0.
By Assumption 1, this increases the long-run utility ū − rI, and by Proposi-
tion 2, it increases the value of the resource W (s, I). Secondly, suppose there
exists an I < I∗ such that ι (s, I, φ (s, I)) > I∗ − I for some s. Let I ′′ be the
largest such I. Then the buyer can marginally improve his welfare by choosing
ι (s, I ′′, φ (s, I ′′)) = I∗ − I ′′. Again, this improves long-run utility by Assump-
tion 1 and increases the value of the resource by Proposition 2. By induction it
follows that cumulative investment ~I must equal I∗.
Secondly, we show that given the seller’s strategy (14), it is optimal to invest
I∗ in one go when the resource is exhausted. When the resource is exhausted,
it is optimal for the buyer to reach the long-run optimal level I∗ as quickly as
possible. Suppose that the buyer’s strategy entails i1 = ι (0, I1, 0) > 0, i2 =
ι (0, I2, 0) > 0 for some 0 < I1 < I2 < I
∗. Then by Assumption 1, the buyer
can marginally improve his welfare by choosing ι (0, I1, 0) = I2 − I1 + i2. By
induction it follows that the buyer invests I∗−I when the resource is exhausted.
14
When the resource is not yet exhausted, it is optimal to delay investments until
exhaustion. Suppose there exists an s > 0 such that ι (s, I, φ (s, I)) > 0 for
some I. Let s3 be the lowest such s. Then the buyer can marginally improve
his welfare by choosing ι (s3, I, φ (s3, I)) = 0 and increasing the investment
at exhaustion by the same amount. This does not affect the long-run utility
ū (c (I∗)), but increases W (s, I) by Proposition 2.
Thirdly, the proof that the seller’s strategy (14) is optimal given buyer’s
strategy (13) is analogous to the last part of the proof of Proposition 2.
D Commitment and subgame perfect equilibria
In this section, we provide an example with an iso-elastic demand function in
which a monopsonistic buyer that already has developed a substitute, as in
Liski and Montero [2011], chooses a lower initial level of resource consumption
under commitment than in closed-loop equilibrium. In the bilateral monopoly
framework that we study in this paper, initial consumption is higher when the
buyer can commit the invention time than in closed-loop equilibrium.
Let u (q) =
√
q, which corresponds to an iso-elastic demand with elasticity 2.
We numerically compute the resource consumption paths in Liski and Montero’s
framework when the buyer can fully commit qt for all t, in closed-loop equilib-
rium (where the buyer’s strategy qt = C (St) is a function of the remaining












s.t. Ṡt = −qt s0 > 0, ST = 0
ṗt = rpt, pT = c
where T denotes the time at which the resource is exhausted and the buyer
switches to the substitute. Liski and Montero, pp. 6 show that the buyer’s



















qT = crs0 (15b)









where qt = C (St) and pt = P (St) are the equilibrium consumption and pricing
rule, respectively. The authors demonstrate (pp. 9) that the equilibrium is







− P (S) + P ′ (S)S = 0 (16)
with boundary condition P (0) = c. Lastly, the social optimum is characterized
by the Hotelling rule, pt = u
′ (qt) and pT = c and has an analytical solution:





. Using MATLAB, we numerically solve (15) and (16) to
determine the consumption paths under commitment and in closed-loop equi-
librium for s0 = 20, c = 0.5, r = 0.04.
3 Figure 4 depicts the results. In line with
the intuition in the main text, resource use in Liski and Montero [2011] is lower
under commitment than in closed-loop equilibrium. When the buyer has full
commitment power, pt = pT e
−r(T−t). By committing to a late switch to the
substitute, the buyer reduces initial extraction but obtains a substantial price
discount.
Now return to the bilateral monopoly model in this paper. Dasgupta et al.
[1983] and Olsen [1986] discuss the buyer’s optimal invention time under com-
mitment at length. We demonstrate the following result through a series of
Lemmas.
Proposition 4. For iso-elastic demand with elasticity equal or larger than 2
and a sufficiently large initial stock, initial resource use is higher when the buyer
commits the invention time at t = 0 than in closed-loop equilibrium.
Lemma 2 (Proposition 1, Olsen [1986]). For iso-elastic demand with elastic-
ity equal or greater than 2 and s0 sufficiently large, the seller has zero stock
remaining at the buyer’s optimal invention time.
Lemma 3 (Dasgupta et al. [1983], pp. 1442). Resource supply at t = 0 in-
creases in the invention time between 0 and the buyer’s optimal invention time.
Lemma 4 (Dasgupta et al. [1983], pp. 1442). For iso-elastic demand with
elasticity equal or greater than 2 and s0 sufficiently large, resource supply at
t = 0 decreases in the buyer’s invention time when the invention time is greater
than the buyer’s optimum.
Lemma 1 implies that resource supply at t = 0 when the buyer commits
to an infinitely large invention time (which is equivalent to c → ∞) is larger
than initial resource supply in closed-loop equilibrium. Then Lemmas 2, 3 and
4 establish the Proposition.
3The code is available upon request.
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Figure 4: Resource consumption in Liski and Montero [2011]
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